IJN Amphibious Ships and landing crafts

Navy Infantry & SNLF

Imperial Japanese Naval Landing Forces

Staged photo for propaganda purposes, would have been perfect for a plastic soldier kit... Was actually the 81st Guard unit troop during a landing drill at Cam Ranh Bay in 1941, in recentky acquired Indochina, so before Pearl Harbor. The Japanese Marines are organized for offensive operations (landings) but were also responsible of guarding Japanese naval facilities at home and overseas. The unit was created in 1876 as way to organized marine infantry already present in ships, and it only rose in size and scope in WWI. It took part in many conflicts and was disbanded in 1945. The modern JSDMF, given its role, lacked a proper amphibian component for long, that is given its status. Only recently it acquired three landing ship tanks, but still, there is no organized marine infantry. Instead, there are two components that are specialized and not replacing any marine infantry: Special Forces such as the SBU (Special Boarding Unit) and MIT (Maritime Interception Team) both dedicated to ship-to ship assault and hostage freeing operations, such as those deployed in Somalian anti-piracy operations. The Japanese Marines are now tinted as a symbol of Japanese Imperialism and few are in favour of its return (but perhaps the US). However given the actual stance of China, we might see the creation of a small contingent in the future, possibly as another "special force". Perhaps it could grow from the only dedicated amphibious unit, the Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade (Suirikukidōdan) belonging not to the Navy but the JSDF and transported by Navy ships. It was created in 2018...

Organization:

Naval Landing Force (Kaigun-rikusen-tai)

Armed sailor in Shanghai, 1932 in full battle gear, Type 30 bayonet fixed, leather Type 38 ammunition pouches. Sailor uniform still. This was before reforms, the uniform being uniformized with IJA's in olive brown. Kaigun-rikusen-tai were Naval shore parties, hoc units from ship's crews for temporary land parties, following European XIXth cent. practice. This one existed not as a homogeneous unit before 1876 but took a new importance from there when the IJN grew in size and scope. Some "landing parties" still were made in WW2 at various occasions, as rifles did lot lacked onboard in 1841-42. Shipboard units took for example part in Davao landings, the "Amatsukaze" and "Bandasan" (crew members from IJN JINTSU and destroyer KUROSHIO, named Jintsu NLF; Kuroshio NLF) according to Underwood; Japanese OOB in WWII, Vol. 1, page 122.

History

The beginning of the SNLF was in the Boxer war, during an intervention (landing party) in the Taku Forts in 1900. Also two full IJA divisions took part in operations ending the Bejing siege and crushing the Boxers. Japan was found at odds with the Russians which used this to occupy Manchuria and despite promises, doubled down developing military bases and a rail network. By February 8, 1904, Japan attacked Port Arthur. Again, the land war was waged by the IJA and ended by the crushing victory at Tsushima and the latter consideably helped the Navy prestige. During this war, small detachments of naval personnel were used for shore patrol duties and sometime raids. This was before the Tokubetsu Rikusentai was properly organized. Postwar, Admiral Togo went to England to study more British naval organization. He was revered there as well, as a successful, faithful student of British naval tactics (and probably bombardded with questions by the admiralty), knowing that Britain was at odds with the Russian Empire for quite a long time, especially about the far east, which spawned the 1903 anglo-japanese alliance. Togo saw the Royal Marines in action and it certainly appealed to him. Instead, however he went to a mix of ship's onboard naval parties and Kaiheidan, guards from Naval Bases, to create an had oc naval landing force. SNLF Infantry in 1940, after the uniform change Nothing concrete was created however, while the IJA honed its skills, after learning from German officers, in Korea, China and the South Seas until WWI broke out. Small naval detachments of armed sailors became a full time naval infantry units, albeit still posted aboard various ships, and without purpose until the IJA decided it was time for land expansion in China, a country in chaos after the 1911 revolution, and seemingly an easy prey. The first step was Manchuria. The real start of the SNLF as an effective, active fighting force was from January 1932, not in Manchuria, but on the 28 when 2,000 SNLF troops were gathered for the “Shanghai Incident.” A skirmish provoked by the Japanese Navy off the International Settlement, followed by Chinese protestations. The Navy "opened the ball" here, followed and reinforced by the IJA. The lessons fro this fight proved instrumental as shaping the SNLF as an elite organization, deployed for difficult assignments. It was the first "special force" of Japan, with perhaps airborne troops. Success trigerred the Navy into creating, based on the four major naval bases in Japan, Kure, Maizuru, Sasebo, and Yokosuka a SNLF unit that was undergoing specialized training and given artillery, but not armour yet. SNLF wearing gas masks during the battle of Shanghai, 1937 Following this, the invasion commenced, but in 1937. This time the needs for troops was so great that the IJA was too happy about dividing areas of interventions: The Navy had to patrol and secure shore areas, defined long the range of existing carrier-borne aviation, while the IJA would have the more prestigious conquest inland. SNLF were thus deployed along the Chinese coast, notably around critical harbours, as the IJA needed to be supplied from the home islands. After the Marco Polo Bridge incodent of July 7, 1937 the SNLF saw action at Shanghai again, but on August 13 clashing with the Chinese 87th and 88th Divisions. The SNLF were about 2,000 strong, close to the International Settlement with a party of 300 armed sailors from Yangtze riverine gunboats, plus 1,000 extras, various Naval personal mainly from bases, arrived from Japan two days prior, despite being opposed 1:7 they stood their ground and the war grew in such proportions the Navy had to raise mode SNLF units in China as the Hankow, Shanghai, and Yangtze River units. When WW2 broke out in the Pacific versus US and Britain, from december 1941, no less than sixteen SNLF units had been created, far more than the four original bases ones. The largest (1,600 men) was the 1st Sasebo SNLF, and 2nd Sasebo (1,400), 1/2nd Kure (1,400 each) and the remainder between 750 and 1,000 men each as well as the 1st and 3rd Yokosuka SNLF paratroopers, 750 men each. The latter were notably committed in the attack on Celebes and the Battle of Manado. These units organically were relatively similar, and ideally equipped with various assets, notably an anti-tank unit and an artillery unit with light guns, and mortars. There were transport and armour if possible, but they were rare and ultimately semi-independent armour detachments were created, originally attached to bases: These semi-independent SNLF armoured components were the Shanghai SNLF Tank Company, Milne Tank Platoon of Kure 5th SNLF, Tarawa Tank Unit of Sasebo 7th SNLF, Navy tank unit Yokosuka 1st SNLF and Itoh Armored Detachment SNLF (unofficial SNLF). Training was provided by Kaiheidan at Kure, Maizuru, Sasebo and Yokosuka with the addition of the Tateyama IJN Ordnance School for armor training and the Amphibious armor school in the IJN aquatic armour unit, Q-Base, Nasake-jima, from 1943. Equipped with amphibious tanks, they were sent to Rabaul in New Guinea and the Marshall Islands but also Saipan, Shimushu and Palau. Uniforms after the 1940 reform became those of the Imperial Japanese Navy Land Force, except SNLF Paratroopers and when on board ships, they wore their standard IJN blue/white uniforms, and on land used the same as the IJA, from 1936-37 onwards. It was a green single breasted tunic, the Rikusenfuku, but with the collar open over the IJN's white trimmed teeshirt but it evolved over time. They had a similar cut, but were olive drab rather than the Army’s khaki and with black rather than brown boots. These uniforms had navy badges sewn over, in red over black background. Troops had sometimes the old stock Adrian helmet used sporadically by rear units until 1941, the 'Brodie' style navy-designed helmet extensively used in Shanghai, and the Type 90 Army helmet, same as the army, and widely adopted. Only difference was the anchor swn over the helmet's felt cap. At their feet they mostly had putties, and in some cases ankle boots and while off duty, tabis. SNLF officers had to procure their own uniform, and so they came with a wide variety in the details, color and texture with stiffer Collars and better quality materials. Unlike the IJA officers they were not uncumbered by the traditional samurai sword and were limited to a pistol, here again not always well defined. While deployed in campaign, SNLF troops carried 6.5mm Arisaka rifles and 6.5mm and 7.7mm Nambu machine guns. They have an Ammunition leather belt with brass buckle (with their own symbol embossed), two front ammunition pouches, rear oiler pouch, bayonet attached to the left side but it was different for support troops which had a pistol holster. They carried the same Haversack as for the IJA troops but smaller and with different material. They carried a Canteen distinct in appearance, not by its canvas cover but colored aluminum cap, commonly worn on the right hip. In the haversack they carried a First aid kit and outside of it, a Gas mask for Some troops Type 93 ot Type 97, two Signal Flags to communicate with Japanese aircraft, with one in each platoon having a Type 90 bugle for communication. South Pacific units were issued Heat Resistant Fatigues in Light-khaki cotton along with shorts. They also carried the traditional Tenugui made of white cloth and printed with an anchor or patriotic phrases worn under the helmet or as "Hachimaki" headband and the Senninbari red-sash belt around the waist. Tactically compared with their army counterparts, Weapons companies also were often oversized, with several rifle platoons and more of “heavy” components, matching their elite status. In fact, they were generally highy regarded as such by Marines that fought them. “Naval units of this type are usually more highly trained” (6th Marine Division intel report before Tarawa, August 1943) “They have a greater tenacity and fighting spirit than the average Japanese Army unit” as reported by Tarawa vets, which one adding “They were pretty tough, and they were big, six-foot, the biggest Japs that I ever saw," (Maj. Lawrence C. Hays) with excellent equipment and lost of surplus and ammo. This came in stark contrast to regular army units.

Japanese Special Naval Landing Forces

IJN Special Landing Forces posing onboard a destroyer by June, 11, 1942. The Kaigun-tokubetsu-rikusen-tai were the first coherent IJN naval infantry, with several Battalion sized units consitituted as the "Naval Corps". This unit was diversified and stretched over the years, until two Special Naval Landing Forces Paratrooper units were also created, sailors with special airborne training. The IJN in 1941 had its own transport aircraft. The "Japanese Marines" ere not independent but entirely under supervision of the Imperial Japanese Navy. It comprised two sub-units:   

Shanghai Special Naval Landing Force

The Shanghai-kaigun-tokubetsu-rikusen-tai was a Special Naval Landing Force established in Shanghai in 1932, 2000 men strong as a brigade with main battalions and organic special weapons units.   

Combined Special Naval Landing Force

The Rengō-tokubetsu-rikusen-tai was a headquarters unit combining several Special Naval Landing Force units into a brigade, with greater firepower.

Base Force

Konkyochi-tai or "Special Base Force" (Tokubetsu-konkyochi-tai) brought administrative and tactical services overseas, so out of Japan, Korea and Formosa. c50 ranging in size (250 to 1500 men) were created across the Pacific, and could include ships for personal transport. The largest was in Kure, another was in Singapore.

Defense Units

The Bōbi-tai ranged from from 250 to 2000 men, guarding naval installations within Japan: Military arsenales and bases, Coastal Artillery and minefields around Japan.

Guard Units

The Keibi-tai ranged from 100 to 1500 men to defend ground IJN facilities, assigned to Base Forces and Special Base Forces. c100 of these units were created, many playing a part in the defense of Japanese held island such as the Iwo Jima Keibi-tai (1000 men, Captain Samaji Inouye) and Okinawa.

Anti-Aircraft Defense Units

The Bōkū-tai were Anti-aircraft artillery units, c200–350 men strong and of three types differing by the importance of the battery: Type A: AA artillery and machine-guns Type B: machine-guns only Type C: machine-guns and machine-cannon. c200 were created to assume AA defense over bases outside Japan, Korea and Formosa, so across the Pacific. They were assigned to Base Forces, Special Base Forces, Special Naval Landing Forces, and Guard Forces.

Anti Aircraft Artillery Batteries

Not the same as above, the Koshaho Chutai were small units of c40-50 men string each, organized for the air defense of important installations but subordinated to Air Defense Sectors of Defense Units. Perhaps 400-600 were created until 1945, most of which ended in home islands.

Construction Battalions

The Setsuei-tai built and repaired naval facilities (airstrips, barracks, ammunition depots and bunkers, fuel depots) at home and abroad. Personnel were mostly unarmed civilians framed by naval engineers overseeing operations, and guard sailors. Local labor was under compulsory service and presumably badly treated.

Communications Units

The Tsūshin-tai comprised around 100–2,000 men stationed ashore to provide a link between Japan and all naval installations aboard as well as the fleets. They played a vital part given the immensity of the theater.

Tokkeitai

The Navy had its own Navy military police unit, stationed in naval installations and occupied territories. They were collaborating with the IJA Kempeitai (military police), and the Keishi-chō civil police as well as Tokkō (secret service) for security, intelligence and counter intelligence.

Naval Corps

The Kaiheidan were a training unit, one located in each of four naval districts, of Yokosuka, Kure, Sasebo and Maizuru, responsible for training enlisted and non-commissioned officer for the navy.

Special Naval Landing Forces (SNLF) in combat

Col. Hatsuo Tsukamoto leading a charge in New Guinea, 1942, for the 5th Sasebo SNLF. Internal organization of these units meant they had access, like IJA unit of that size, to organic artillery, and when possible, armour. The SNLF for example had an organic anti-tank bataillon equipped with the Type 94 or Type 1 37 mm Anti-Tank Guns or the rarer Type 1 47 mm Anti-Tank Gun. Organic artillery batteries used the 75mm regimental gun, 70mm Type 92 Gun, 3-inch naval gun mounted on wheeled carriage, and at company level, Type 97 81mm Infantry Mortar and Type 11 37 mm Infantry Gun, but also a small AA detachment equipped either with the Type 92 13.2 mm AA heavy machine-gun on twin mount or 25 mm shipboard AA gun adapted for land use in some cases. As for the armour component (see the assets below), it could comprise a large variety of ordnance, from regular to amphibious tanks and armoured cars. The infantry made use of the Type 92 bipod-mounted MG per platoon or the Type 92 13.2 mm heavy machine gun at company level ahd HQ, Type 3, Type 92 heavy machine guns and more commonly the Type 11 light machine gun. The basic SNLF weapon was till the standard Arisaka rifle and later Type I Rifle plus bayonets as well as Hamada, Nambu pistols and Type 26 revolvers or Sugiura pistol, MP 18 and MP 28, Type 100, Model 2 submachine guns for officers and specialized troops. There were also hand-held Light Mortars at platoon level, as well as Type 97 hand grenades, various Grenade launchers, Rifle grenades, Light antitank weapons, Flamethrowers and some Military swords for officers willing to carry them. The SNLF, recruitment-wise, always was more demanding and elite compared to the IJA. First off, a new recruit needed to be a sailor first, infantry second, whatever its specialized training, meaning a longer, more demanding learning path. Plus there was since 1937 Shanghai its "elite" or "special operation" nature, which seduced many, added to the choice in 1940 between the meatgrinder of China or pleasant overseas trips in the Pacific. Of course the reality was quite different (see below).

Combat records

Invasion Time: First line or spec-ops

The 1st and 2nd Sasebo, 2nd Yokosuka SNLF were gathered for the assault on Luzon, and assigned to seizing and securing airfields. 1st Kure SNLF was later sent in the first wave at Legaspi. The army followed. The 1st and 2nd Kure, 1st and 2nd Sasebo, 1st, 2nd, 3rd Yokosuka SNLF undertook quite often similar first waves or special operations during the Dutch East Indies campaign. The 2nd Kure led the assault at the battle at Tarakan. A single company was dectached from 1st Maizuru SNLF to assault Wake Island, but were repulsed with great losses, and seconded by 2nd Maizuru which was successful. The first airborne landing (Yokosuka SNLF) was performed on Menado island, Celebes (1st Yokosuka). They were to link to the 1st Sasebo landing over the beach. On Sumatra, the 3rd Yokosuka paradropped to link up with the two combined Sasebo SNLFs at Kaepong, but were decimated. The prestigious airborne units were formed in September 1941 and only dropped the first time in November and this lack of experience was their disservice.

On the defence: Fanatical

As losses amounted, SNLF units often were reconstituted from the remainder of some units, completed by rookies, and they had very little training before being sent back on the frontline. On Tulagi, U.S. Marines met the 3rd Kure SNLF and they fought hard. At Guadalcanal however the 5th Yokosuka SNLF was less tough and had to be saved by IJA reinforcements. By 1944 the assaults by the SNLF were pretty much done and the strategy shifted towards "last ditch reiforcements" as Japan was now on the defensive, always trying to second-guess the next fast carrier force (3/5th fleet) campaign and redirect to the threatened islands a garrison of SNLF, sometimes boasting their elite qualities to dissect separately companies, sent to reinforce army units peal-meal. For the remainder of the war these units still showed a fanatical determination like for the Army, by default of sufficient equipments, supplies or just training. Probably their most renown defence was during the assault on Tarawa, by the entire 7th Sasebo SNLF reinforced by less quality 3rd Base Defense Unit. Meanwhile the two ex-airborne Yokosuka units were exterminated to the last man at Saipan.

War Crimes

It should be noted also that the Navy at large (and SNLF) was also judged for war crime after the war, just as the army. Not only by their treatment of allied pilots and POWS in general, but SNLF and even naval base defense troops stationed in the Philippines had no issues killing tens of thousands of Filipino civilians as "punishment" as the battle of Manila commenced in 1945. Just as the army, although they were practically never assigned to guard camps, there were using forced labour, POWs of locals until exhaustion and death and use "comfort women" as well. There were reported cases postwar of men rescued by IJN ships, interrogated with torture and then attached to a heavy load and thrown overboard to drawn. In fact, after 20 March 1943, officers of the Imperial Japanese Navy ordered and encouraged the Navy to execute all prisoners taken at sea. There were also the infamous "hell ship", some under the responsibility of the Navy. As the retreat from South Pacific waters progressed, rather than to leave camps unattended, POWs (also considered as labour) were loaded to the brim in cargo ships, left without food, water in the holds under scorching heat. So crowded they couldn't get air to breathe. Some went mad to not suffocate and went as far as murder to just get on top. Those which had enough strenght to climb ladders were beaten back. These ships were also often sunk by US subs or aviation and of course the guards left the doors closed when the ships sank. By willfull negligence, these ships were unmarked, so pilots had no idea what they were attacking, which was also against conventions. The Navy also never hesitated to attack hospital ships, despite their obvious markings. There were six documented cases.

Units (and records when available)

1st Kure SNLF

It was created at Hainan Naval District, 3rd China Fleet. Took part in the Landing at Legaspi, (Philippines).

2nd Kure SNLF

1401 men, it took part in the Landing at Jolo Island (Philippines)

3rd Kure SNLF

Two infantry battalions formed at the Kure Naval District, it saw action in China in 1937-40 until depletion, and the second was formed in 1942, taking part in the invasion of Tulagi and Milne Bay.

5th Kure SNLF

Single naval infantry battalion formed on May 1, 1942, before the Battle of Midway, for the island's invasion. Following the defeat, part of it took part in the battle of Milne Bay, survived but so crippled it was disbanded.

6th Kure SNLF

no data

7th Kure SNLF

no data

1st Maizuru SNLF

746 men, formed zt Hainan Naval District, 3rd China Fleet.

2nd Maizuru SNLF

This single battalion, 1069 men, was Formed at the Maizuru Naval District in 1941 and took part in the first battle of Wake Island and invasion of Kavieng. Weakened, it was disbanded on February 1, 1942 to form a ground security section in the 8th Special Base Force, Rabaul.

3rd Maizuru SNLF

no data

4th Maizuru SNLF

no data

5th Maizuru SNLF

no data

1st Sasebo SNLF

1622 men. Landing on Menado, Celebes

2nd Sasebo SNLF

1473 men, under 32 Special Base Force, 3rd FleetUnder 32nd Special Base Force, 3rd Fleet

5th Sasebo SNLF

no data

6th Sasebo SNLF

no data

7th Sasebo SNLF

no data

8th Sasebo SNLF

746 men, formed at Hainan Naval District, 3rd China Fleet

Sasebo Combined SNLF

Combined 1st and 2nd Sasebo SNLF after losses.

1st Yokosuka SNLF

Originally an SNLF Para formation. 1st Yokosuka SNLF Parachute trained, disbanded after its operations in Celebes were completed. 3rd Yokosuka SNLF Made a drop on Timor and was later taken into the

1st Yokosuka SNLF.

849 men, Parachuted onto Menado airfield, Celebes. Later reconstituted, island defence, Saipan, to the last man.

2nd Yokosuka SNLF

Originally 746 men, SNLF Para formation, dropped on Miri, Seria, and Lutong, Sarawak. Reconstituted, spent at Saipan.

3rd Yokosuka SNLF

Originally an SNLF Para formation, 849 men, took part in the Landing on Koepang, Timor Island, whereabouts unknown

4th Yokosuka SNLF

746 men, formed at Hainan Naval District, 3rd China Fleet

5th Yokosuka SNLF

Unit destroyed at Guadalcanal, late 1942

6th Yokosuka SNLF

Became the 3rd Special Base Force on Feb. 15, 1943, destroyed in Gilberts Islands, split between Tarawa and Makin with its tank detachment (3rd SBF) on Makin.

7th Yokosuka SNLF

no data

Shanghai SNLF

c2000 men, special naval guard based in Shanghai port, China belonged in China Theater Fleet.

Hankou SNLF

Detachment of the Shanghai SNLF. (Unofficially known as SNLF).

Navy amphibious assets

The largest and most famous dedicated landing ship of the IJN. The No.101-class landing ships (Dai 101 Gō-gata Yusōkan) were designed and commissioned by the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) for the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA). The design was unitary but the No.101 class had diesel engines, No.103-class had a steam turbine. In the Navy they were cammed 2nd class transporter (2-Tō Yusōkan) but the No.103 class had the SB-tei army variant. Genesis statted in June 1943 after the Guadalcanal Campaign, the IJN wanted a new type of high-speed military transport vessel and devised a 1,500-ton mothership for Daihatsu-class landing craft/Kō-hyōteki-class submarines and the No.101 class 900-ton amphibious assault ship, studying also the IJA SS-class. The IJN found them ill-suited for mass-production, but there was cooperation between the two arms on a new amphibious assault ship. The deal was that the IJN would providing its design expertise, shipyards, the IJA offering mineral resources. Part of the intel came from studied made by observers in Operation Torch, photographs and sketches of the LCT Mk.V notably. By August 1943 Kampon studied created a basic design, larger variant of the LCT and by September the Kure Naval Arsenal completed a ship in two months, as the No.101, laid down in November. The type was to have a new turbine engine developed, not ready in time and replaced by disels n the first six. Steam turbines were adopted for the next No.103 class (IJN SB (T)). As it was a joint program, some vessels went to the IJN and others to the IJA (32). However its engineers had issues with the steam turbines and 10 vessels were returned to the IJN. Some were converted to coal-fired boilers in January 1945. Overall, over 103 planned, 69 were completed, the Navy having 49, the Army 20. 41 were lost (all but one, Navy). Most of Navy ones took part in the Battle of Leyte, 18 lost, but landing tanks and troops. The IJA had ten in the Philippines Campaign, Luzon northern coast, Taiwan and Ryukyu Islands. The remaining vessels were used in the Japanese mainland sea. After the war (9 survived the war) they went as war prize in the Chinese and Soviet Navies. Specs N°101: 950t standard, 1,010t trial, 80.50 x 9.10 x 5.65m (264 ft 1 in x 29 ft 10 in x 18 ft 6 in), 3× intermediate diesels 1,200 bhp 13.4 knots RA 3,000 nmi Capacity: 320 troops, 26 tons freight and 13 Type 95 Ha-Go, or 9 Type 97 Chi-Ha, 7 Type 2 Ka-Mi, 5 Type 3 Ka-Chi or 250 tons supplies, crew 90, armament one 76.2 mm (3.00 in) L/40 AA, 6× Type 96 25 mm AA guns, 6× depth charges. Specs N°103: 870/1,020 long tons, same dims, one Kampon geared turbine, 2x Kampon water tube boilers 16 kts 1,000 nmi (1,900 km) at 16 kn. Same capacity but 1944, 16 × Type 96 25 mm AA guns, 4× 13 mm AA guns and 12× depth charges. Tsuta in 1943, of the Momi class (1919) The IJN during the war converted many destroyers to transport use. These were mostly late WW1 vintage designs such as the Momi, Minekaze and Kamikaze. The need emerged well before the Guadalcanal campaign, in 1941, when it appeared fast supply assets were needed for special operations with the SNLF. Destroyers being nimble, fast and agile, seemed less risky than other vessels, especially expandable ones of that era. But this made sense in the Solomons and these converted destroyers were not a rare sight. The conversion was radical and not reversible: The very last aft hull section was entirely gutted and cut downwards from the quarterdreck house, until the poop at sea level. On this, a ramp was installed in order to support various payloads. These destroyers could carry a standard Daihatsu type landing craft or one or two Kaiten class submarines depending on the configuration. The latter was a 1944 conversion. There were also tanker conversion, with two boilers removed and replaced by these, top speed 16 knots, one or two main guns, single torpedo tube bank, renamed and used as training ships. Most of the converted fast transport destroyers survived the war, unlike the regular ones, of the 17 Momi class, 9 were converted as patrol ship or 5 as fast tankers, the remainder three were lost in convoy by submarines or aviation. Of course during the Guadalcanal campaign, the "Tokyo express" consisted in cruisers and unmodified destroyers act as ad-hoc fast transports by night. They would tow supply barges or drop supplies overboard in buoyant steel drums and racing back to their bases, especially in 1943 when the admiralty decided to not risk any cruiser anymore. Two Minekaze destroyers were converted as fast transports in the same way as the Momi, and Matsu-class destroyer conversion: Stern sloping down to the waterline to deploy Daihatsu landing craft or other boats as well as amphibious tanks or paletted cargo. However whe the latter were operational, offensive operations were now over, but they still found use to supply isolated garrison islands, until submarines were preferred due to losses. The Guadalcanal campaign no doubt opened the eyes of the admiralty about a new way to supply their troops in hostile environments. Thus was launched the design of a dedicated ship, the No. 1 class landing ship. The design however started in 1943 but the first was only Completed by early 1944, long after the campaign, and so devoide of us, it was used instead as convoy escort to Saipan before being badly damaged by aviation and towed to Palau, stationed there as AA platform until sunk in July 1944. She was the lead ship of the Dai 1 Gō-gata Yusōkan, 34 planned, 21 completed, 13 cancelled. These were the first Imperial Japanese Navy dedicated fast amphibious assault ships, tailored to rapidly land troops, vehicles, and cargo. They displaced 1,500 tons standard load, and had a single Kampon geared turbine, one shaft, two Kampon 9,500 shaft horsepower (7,100 kW) water-tube boilers. This was a no-backup, simplified powerplant, but enough to propel them to 22 knots (25 mph; 41 km/h) with sufficient fuel reserves for 3,700 nmi (6,900 km). More so, they had the same aft sloped deck, but arranged in a way of carrtying this time four Daihatsu landing craft or seven Type 2 Ka-Mi amphibious tanks, two Kō-hyōteki-class submarines. Given that era, they were heavily armed between a twin forward 127 mm (5 in) Type 89 dual purpose gun and ten 25 mm (1 in) Type 96 anti-aircraft guns in three triple, one twin, four single mounts.To deal with submarines they also possessed 42 depth charges and four throwers. They had also a full electronic suite, the Type 22 search radar, Type 93 sonar and Type 93 hydrophones so usable as escorts when not used in their primary mission. No. 1 was laid down at Kure Naval Arsenal on 5 November 1943, launched on 8 February 1944, completed on 10 May. She was followed by 20 others, numbered T N°1 to T N°21. 22 was never completed, destroyed on slip 80% complete. They were used as multi-purpose ships, transports, minelayers escorts, most being sunk in the Battle of Leyte and en route or coming back from the Bonin Islands. Only 5 vessels survived. LS-5 with Kaiten aboard Quick specs: 1,500t standard/1,800t trial, 96 x 10.2 x 3.6 m mean (315 ft x 33 ft 6 in x 11 ft 10 in). On shaft, Kampon geared turbine, 2× Kampon water tube boilers 9,500 shp, 22 knots, 3,700 nmi , crew 148. The Imperial Japanese Navy used mostly Army designs which filled all the types and roles required for the Japanese Marines. Some were tailored for amphibious operations, but not all. There will be a more detailed study of those amphibians. Tankettes, light and medium tanks: Type 89A I-Go tank of a SNLF unit. Paint was generally grey, anchors symbols prominent. -Type 94 tankette -Type 97 Te-Ke tankette -Type 95 Ha-Go light tank -Type 2 Ke-To light tank -Type 4 Ke-Nu light tank -Type 89 I-Go medium tank (Chi-Ro) -Type 97 Chi-Ha medium tank -Type 97 ShinHōtō Chi-Ha medium tank (Kai; improved) -Type 1 Chi-He medium tank -Type 3 Chi-Nu medium tank Type 89 I-Go, the first IJA/IJN tank, here in Shanghai, 1932 Type 95 Ha-Go of the SLNF, amphibious operations in the south-western Pacific, fall 1941/early 1942. Type 94 Te-Ke Tankette of the SLNF, Shanghai, 1937. Amphibious tanks -Type 1 Mi-Sha (a/k/a Type 1 Ka-Mi) amphibious tank prototype -Type 2 Ka-Mi amphibious tank -Type 3 Ka-Chi amphibious tank -Type 5 To-Ku amphibious tank prototype Type 2 Ka-Mi. The idea of an amphibious tank had been around since WWI, and after the relative export success that was the Vickers amphibian tankette, by 1928 it's the IJA, not the IJN, that wanted its own amphibious tank, with the idea of using it to cross marshy, swampy or damp terrain, and rivers after bridges had been blow out. The army tested the Type 1 "Mi-Sha", SR-II Ro-Go or Ishikawajima Amphibian. But nothing came of these. By 1940 however, now the Navy expressed its interest for the concept and took matter in its own hands. The IJN devised a its own tailored tank to equip the Special Naval Landing Forces and for special operations. The Type 2 Ka-Mi was designed in 1941, production started in 1942. It was caracterized by a main tank hull surrounded by detachable pontoons acting as floatation device while swimming, procuring buoyancy and hydrodynamic qualities in order notably to cope with waves in high seas. Only 184 were manufactured, based on components from the Type 95 Ha-Go, with parts hand-built over 1942-1943. The Navy also operated the rarer Type 3 Ka-Chi. When entering service, the IJN was on the defensive and so they were used for infantry support in the 1st Yokosuka Special Naval Landing Force based at Saipan and fought in Leyte in 1944, the remainder spread between units in the Southern Pacific and East Indies, a few encountered in the Marianna, Marshalls, Guam, Aitape, Biak. Type 4 Ka-Tsu. These were originally large amphibious tracked carriers to be transported underwater by submarines. The idea emerged during the Solomons campaign, to supply isolated garrisons, a result of the US "island-hopping" campaign. However few were used that way and rather modified as torpedo carriers for the Operation Yu-Go, the Attack on the Majuro atoll. It was cancelled after were discovered the numerous deficiencies of the Ka-Tsu. They would have been deployed from IJN submarines the I-36, I-38, I-41, I-44, and I-53, modified to carry two each. Amphibious APC: -S B swamp vehicle prototype -F B swamp vehicle -Type 4 Ka-Tsu amphibious APC vehicle Self-Propelled vehicles -Type 1 Ho-Ni I 75 mm SPH -Type 1 Ho-Ni II 105 mm SPH -Type 2 Ho-I gun tank -Type 3 Ho-Ni III gun tank -Type 4 Ho-Ro 150 mm SPH -Type 5 Na-To 75 mm SP AT gun -Short Barrel 120 mm gun tank -Navy Long Barrel 12 cm Self-propelled gun (Experimental) Armoured cars: A Crossey Type 2587 operated by the IJN on coastal China. Note the different color pattern. Anchors were painted on the front and rear, and a large Kyokujitsu-ki flag on either side. The Type 92 naval armored car was probably the only proper model developed for the IJN. -Vickers Crossley armoured car -Type 2592 Chiyoda armored car -Sumida Model P armored car -Type 93 armoured car* Also called Type 2593 Hokoku, Type 93 Kokusan or "Type 92" naval armored car The Type 2 Su-Ki was an amphibious truck inspired notably by the GMC DUCKW, known since Operation Torch landings back in November 1942, via German intel. It also emerged from the needs of new ways to supply garrisons after the Solomons campaign. About 198 were made, produced by Toyota between November 1943 and August 1944. But they were flawed vehicles and Toyota tried to work on the Su-Ki II and III afterwards as well as the more ambitious Toyota LVT in 1945, none entering production. Softskin vehicles: -Type 95 recon car Mini-truck -Amphibious truck Su-Ki

IJA Amphibious Brigades

And of course because of inter-service rivalry, the IJA wanted its own "amphibian troops". The Kaijō kidō ryōdan were marines brigades developed in the Imperial Japanese Army from 1943. Although invasions were over, the the Headquarters wanted to to defend strategic Pacific islands garrison with IJA troops a rapid deployment amphibious unit not under IJN control. But since this expertise was upon the Navy, both services had to collaborate, and started from the already trusted composition of the IJA The Amphibious Brigades but with additional training for amphibious operations. Mobility was reduced due to the lack of vehicles attached, compensated by more ammunitions (35,643 rounds for the 81mm mortars, 7,445 rounds for 75mm guns for example). They were indeed reinforcement forces dedicated to sustain later a US assault. The was a Brigade staff with nine amphibious vehicles (on paper) Three Infantry battalions divided themselves into the following:

• 3 infantry companies
• 1 artillery company (3 × 75 mm Mountain Guns and 2 × Infantry Guns )
• 1 mortar company each (12 × 81 mm mortars)
• 1 sapper company
• 1 Anti-aircraft company (six guns)
• 1 Armored company (nine light tanks)
• 1 Engineering company
• 1 Communication company
• 1 Medical and sanitation company

This force to be carried was allocated, still on paper, with L150 Daihatsu-class landing craft, 10 SS-class landing ship and 10 Type 4 MGB "Ka-Ro" for fire support But almost none SS-class and MTBs were attached in sufficient numbers. Four amphibious brigades of the IJA were created. The first was based at Truk, placed under the IJN 4th Fleet. It was based at Eniwetok and between the sinking of its mothership, Aikoku Maru at Truk on 17 February 1944, the remaining troops until Lt. General Nishida were annihilated during the Battle of Eniwetok (17 to 23 February 1944). The 2nd Brigade was created in Manchukuo from the 5th Independent Garrison Unit, staffed by personal from the 29th Division and sent to the Southern Expeditionary Army Group in the Philippines in May 1944 and rerouted later to the western New Guinea, under the IJA 2nd Army. It could not be sent because of no tranbsport available to reinforce the beleaguered garrison at Biak (27 May – 17 August 1944) and stayed isolated at Sorong until August 1945. The 3nd Brigade was created under Colonel Ikeda Einosuke in Shumshu, Kuril Islands, under command of the IJA 27th Army, and stayed this north to defend against a possible US landing before transf to Hokkaido. Colonel Ikeda died when his transport was sunk by a US submarine, replaced by Colonel Kurashi. May 1945 saw it atached to the IJA 40th Army, transferred to Kyushu, but one company was later sent back to Paramushir in the Kuriles. On 23 May 1945 the brigade was dissolved and joined the IJA 125th Independent Mixed Brigade, Kagoshima Prefecture. The 4th Brigade was born in May 1944 under Major General Torihiko Mineki, at Asahikawa, Hokkaido with staff and three battalions from the 7th Infantry Division and an armored company in Morioka, artillery company in Kokura, under command of the 27th Army, also to defend the Kuril islands. In May 1945 transports were allocated to leave to Honshu under the 36th Army, Saitama Prefecture, defenses of Tokyo with the 1st Armored Division, but used for... road maintenance work and to grow crops. It is certain that these units were clearly constituted of mainly reserve or disbanded units, staffed and crewed with what was available, and rarely given the adequate transports. This was crucial as without them, the very concept of a quick reinforcement amphibious brigade was meaningless. But by 1944 the rampage of US Submarine made it perilous to go anywhere surfaced. The last two brigades were in the Kuriles waiting for a landing that never came, and later relocated in the home island for the main landing (Operation Olympic) which also never came. The only unit that really fought, although understrenght, was the first, at the battle of Eniwetok. Most of its troops and assets went down with its mothership, and for the 2nd, stranded in New Guinea, its supply ship with most of its ammunition and food was also sunk, leaving a rather poor record.

IJN Landing ships in operations

This chapter is reserved for a future post update.

The Shanghai Landings (1937)

(More to come)

Resources

Books

Masao Fujita Unknown Records of Army Ship Corps, April 2008 issue Underwood, John: The Japanese Order of Battle in World War II. Vol. I. The Nafziger Collection, 1999 Madej, Victor: Japanese Army Forces Order of Battle 1937-1945 . Volume I + II. Game Marketing Company, 1981. Ness, Leland: Rikugun. Guide to Japanese Ground Forces 1937-1945. Helion & Co 2014 Donaldson, Graham (1999–2000). "The Japanese paratroopers in the Dutch East Indies, 1941-1942". Rottman & Takizawa 2008, World War II Japanese Tank Tactics. Osprey Publishing. Imperial Japanese Army and Navy Uniforms and Equipment by Tadao Nakata and Thomas B. Nelson Imperial Japanese Army and Navy Uniforms and Equipments by Lionel Leventhal Limited United States Army's TM-E 30-480 Handbook On Japanese Military Forces Zaloga, Steven J. (2007). Japanese Tanks 1939–45. Osprey Publishing. Taki's Imperial Japanese Army Page - Akira Takizawa L, Klemen (1999–2000). "Japanese Uniforms, 1941-1942". Forgotten Campaign: The Dutch East Indies Campaign 1941-1942. Yaklitch, Alsleben and Takizawa. "Japanese Special Naval Landing Forces". The Netherlands East Indies 1941-1942.

Links

combinedfleet.com - TETSUSEI DAI HATSUDOTEI, IJA Landing Craft Depot Ships
ONI plates on archive.hnsa.org



tokusetsukansen.jpn.org/ navgunschl2.sakura.ne.jp/ ijn_end-of-war.pdf archive.org/ USANJOR194401 lonesentry.com/ barges.html hneck.web.fc2.com maritime.org/ oni208j-far-eastern-small-craft/index.php archive.org/ ONI208JSupplements2And3/page/n5/mode/2up archive.org/ ONI208JSupplements2And3/page/n39/mode/2up combinedfleet.com Shinshu_t.htm en.wikipedia.org/ List_of_Japanese_Navy_ships_and_war_vessels_in_World_War_II 2u.biglobe.ne.jp forum.axishistory.com/ 1st Amphibious Brigade ibiblio.org Strategy-27.html overdrive.com/ japanese-special-naval-landing-forces Special_Naval_Landing_Forces https://download.e-bookshelf.de/download/0000/7057/78/L-X-0000705778-0007112298.XHTML/index.xhtml avalanchepress.com/SNLF.php warfare.gq/ dutcheastindies SNLF forum.axishistory.com

Videos

The Rikusentai: Did the Japanese had "marines" ?
Part II
https://youtu.be/OYxahYOS0bk History not vizualized, IJN Marines in WW2

Books

Neushul, Peter (1998). "Andrew Jackson Higgins and the Mass Production of World War II Landing Craft". The Journal of the Louisiana Historical Association Goldstein, Richard (5 January 2009). "Victor H. Krulak, Marine Behind U.S. Landing Craft, Dies at 95 (Published 2009)". The New York Times. Jentschura, Hansgeorg; Jung, Dieter; and Mickel, Peter. Translated by Brown, J.D. 1977. Warships of the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1869–1945. NIP Morison, Samuel Eliot. 1950. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, Volume VI. Little, Brown, and Company. Parillo, Mark P. 1993. The Japanese Merchant Marine in World War II. NIP "Memorial stone in Sasebo". Archived from the original on 6 March 2016. Retrieved 30 January 2011.
Japanese Escorts". Combinedfleet.com. Retrieved 2 April 2013.
"Rekishi Gunzō"., History of the Pacific War Vol. 51, "The truth histories of the Imperial Japanese Vessels Part.2", Gakken (Japan), 2005
Rekishi Gunzō, History of the Pacific War Vol. 62, "Ships of the Imperial Japanese Forces", Gakken (Japan)
The Maru Special, Japanese Naval Vessels No. 50, "Japanese minesweepers and landing ships", Ushio Shobō (Japan), 1981.
Ships of the World, Special issue Vol. 47, "Auxiliary Vessels of the Imperial Japanese Navy", "Kaijinsha"., (Japan), 1997.
Shizuo Fukui, Japanese Naval Vessels Survived, "Their post-war activities and final disposition", Shuppan Kyodosha (Japan), 1961.
Shizuo Fukui, FUKUI SHIZUO COLLECTION "Japanese Naval Vessels 1869–1945", KK Bestsellers (Japan), 1994.