V25 class destroyer (1913)

Germany (1913-1916): 71 Type 1913 Hochseetorpedoboot: 62 lost.

The German V25-class were the largest class of destroyers (“Hochseetorpedoboote”) or “high seas torpedo boats”, albeit in service with the Imperial German Navy (Kaiserliches Marine) they were designated as the Großes Torpedoboot 1913 Klasse. They former the bulk of its fleet operations in 1914-18, issued from the 1913 naval program for several 12-boats flotillas. They were built by all destroyer-capable shipyards, starting with AG Vulcan, Stettin (V25-30, 43-48, 69, 71-85, 78, 80-82) then Hamburg (V67 and following until V85), Schichau Elbing (S31-36, 49-66 boats) and Germaniawerft (G37-42, 85-95). They were all turbine-powered and unlike the V1 class were smaller to be lighter, faster and more agile, to the price of degraded seaworthiness compared to V180 group. Most survived to be integrated in the Reichsmarine, and some later in the Kriegsmarine, whereas the V25 groups and follow-up were in reaction, much larger to recuperate seaworthiness, but lost a bit of agility. This was soon seen as worthwile, albeit the “toothbrush style” was at last seen as inferior to the 1916 British designs.

Development

The belief of Agility above all else

The V1 class had been a smaller take on the concept of large torpedo boat, when defined in 1910, FY1911 and FY1912 programs these “Große Torpedoboote” were designed based on the naval staff belief previous boats of the S138 group were too large and slow for efficient fleet operations. They needed a more aggressive approach to fleet integration and that new generation was to act both as escort and take more offensive roles during the fight, not only countering enemy’s own destroyers, but leading torpedo attacks of their own to disrupt the British battle line. Some aspects of these tactics were tried at Jutland, albeit paradoxically only possible due to the bad weather and low visibility. On paper, it made sense, but by clear weather and visibility, they needed to approach dangerously close to the battle line to deliver then short-ranged torpedoes: The 19.7-inch G7 version carried a 440-pound charge and could reach only at 28-knot setting 10,950 yards (10 km) in 11.8 seconds.

At that distance, they arrived under the range of dreadnought’s secondary QF guns, the Orions and follow-up 4-inch (102 mm) guns firing at 11,600 yards (10,600 m) at 15°. When the V1 were approved (a restart of the numeration was decided to mark a rupture compared to older designs) half were ordered from Vulcan, Stettin, other from Germaniawerft Kiel and under FY1912 a further 12 from Schichau, Elbling. Construction was judged also a bit cheaper, at just under 1.7 million marks per ship. However, some in the Navy, and the majority of naval engineers sensed that smaller hull will be sensible to degraded weather, which was common to the North Sea, the likely spot where they were supposed to operate with the high sea fleet. In truth, they were more useful to the Baltic, but flotillas there were already filled with older torpedo boats. Eventually, the fear of a lack of reliability in heavy weather (force 6 winds, where guns and torpedo tubes become unusable) force the hand of the staff, after a forced rejuvenation it was decided the next class would be larger precisely to avoid this pitfall. The V1 soon were nicknamed “Lanskrüppel” or “Admiral Lans’ cripples”.

V43 underway, part of the 3rd order.

Return to Form

The first series from Vulcan were already designed to be larger, at 77.80 meters versus 71,1 meters for the V1 class. As V1 and sisters made their trials, it became soon obvious previous unheard warnings had been true and as long as these series went on, the size rose to 82.50 meters. it was also true for the beam, brining more stability. Together, they represented a new generation of larger vessels with fuel oil boilers and more powerful armament. A total of six V25 ships were built so one half-flotilla. Under the same FY1913, six more of the S 31 class were ordered for another half flotilla. Then came the G 37 (6 ships), V 43 (6 ships), S 49 (18 ships, three half-flotillas), V 67 (18, same) and G 85 (11, 1 full flotilla).

12 more of a different design were ordered, even larger, also equipped with fuel oil boilers but armed with a larger number of more modern guns. These last series had better seaworthiness, higher speed, greater range and firepower. The order for twelve units was placed with two German shipyards, resulting in two slightly different classes. The first series were commissioned in 1914, the second six from Schichau-Werke shipyard Elbing and S 31 class as well, so most crews had little time to train before the war started. Next series entered service later in the war and were thrown into the furnace with little training and losses were heavy, notably due to mines.
However the base recipe did not changed much: The main armament consisted of three 88mm/42 TK L/45 C/14 guns, six 500mm torpedo tubes (two twin, two single) with four spare torpedoes and up to 24 naval mines. The propulsion was the same three Marine boilers, two AEG-Vulcan (or others, see notes) steam turbines with an output of 23,500 hp (also, see notes) driving two propellers and two funnels for an average top speed of 33.5 knots, range of 1,080 nautical miles at 20 knots. In 1916, V 25 was temporarily modified to experiments with the Friedrichshafen FF.33 for reconnaissance with a platform forward twin torpedo tube. This was for extending their scouting abilities, when acting as the Hochseeflotte’s vanguard.

Design of the class

Hull and general design

The V25 class and follow-up varied in dimensions, gradually increased from 77.80 to 82.50 meters (255 ft 3 in to 270 ft 8 in) at the waterline, 78.50 to 83.10 m (257 ft 7 in to 272 ft 8 in) overall for a beam that rose to 8.32 and up to 8.36 m (27 ft 4 in to 27 ft 5 in), draft of 2.80 to 3.90 m (9 ft 2 in to 12 ft 10 in). Displacement started at 812 as designed, light and up to 960 metric tons (799 to 945 long tons), going up to 971 and up to 1,188 t (956 to 1,169 long tons) when fully loaded. To compare, The V1 class measured 70.2 m (230.3 ft) overall, 70.2 metres (230 ft 4 in) at the waterline, for a beam of 7.6 m (24.9 ft) and draft of 3.1 m (10.2 ft), displacement standard 570 tonnes, 569 tonnes (560 long tons) normal and 697 tonnes (686 long tons) deep load.
The V25 crew and follow-up comprised three officers and 80 ratings with some having 2-4 extra sailors if needed and when acting as half-flotilla flagships there was a small leader’s staff of three officers and 13-15 ratings in addition. With cramped accommodations, this was not popular.

However the same general shape, was the same “toothbrush” style with a had a short, raised foredeck for a forward main gun. The deck sloped downwards to creating a “well” before a small foredeck superstructure on the main deck where the two single tubes were located. V 6 test of a longer foredeck with the superstructure placed on it, showed it better sea keeping but was still not retain for V25 and follow-up series. Thy also still had two widely spaced, slightly sloping funnels, small deckhouse at the stern, two raked masts and were painted entirely black but their identification numbers. Both the masts and funnels could sport color bands and flags or symbols for formation drills. Their hull was also divided by bulkheads into 12 watertight compartments.

Powerplant

The powerplant comprised the same three standard admiralty or “Marine” design oil-fired boilers. No long coal-fired. The exhaust were vented into two funnels, feeding steam to two direct-drive steam turbines. The Type was varying by builder. Vulcan boats had AEG turbines, others had Germaniawerft or Schichau models. They were rated at 24,000 shaft horsepower (18,000 kW), instead of 17,000 metric horsepower (17,000 shp; 13,000 kW) on the previous V1. So design speed went from 32 knots (59 km/h; 37 mph) to 33.5 to 34.5 knots (62.0 to 63.9 km/h; 38.6 to 39.7 mph). The 24K shp. was routinely exceeded on trials, see details for each sub-group below.

Fuel was also greatly increased for proper fleet operation across the North Sea and back. Instead of 107 tonnes (105 long tons) of coal, 78 tonnes (77 long tons) of oil for the previous V1, making for a poultry range of 1,190 nautical miles (2,200 km; 1,370 mi) at 17 knots (31 km/h; 20 mph) or 490 nautical miles (910 km; 560 mi) at 29 knots as long as the weather was mild, the V25 were designed to deal with heavy weather, with a storage capacity doubled and later almost triple, from 220 to 338 t (217 to 333 long tons; 243 to 373 short tons) of fuel oil for a radius between 1,080 to 1,810 nautical miles (2,000 to 3,350 km; 1,240 to 2,080 mi) at 20 knots. The first two half-flotillas had the least endurance. Each had also two 28 KW (38 hp) 110-Volt turbogenerators providing electrical power when the ships were cold. Steering counted on a pair of rudders, primary at the stern, the secondary being a retractable rudder in the bow, mostly used for low speed in harbour manoeuvres.

Armament

The V25 group were not armed the same V1 or previous boats, as they went from two to three 88mm/45 SK L/45 C/13 deck guns and four 500mm TT (all single tube, one spare torpedo, 5 total). They were also capable of carrying and laying 18 mines but were devoid of any ASW grenade. This differed from the two twin torpedo tubes inline of previous groups, but again, believed to bring extra “agility” in battle as well. 50cm tubes were introduced in the G169 group back in 1908.

8.8 cm SK L/45

The 8,8-cm-Schnelladekanone SK L/45 was adopted on the mount MPL C/13. One was located on the forecastle, another aft amidship on the platform, and the last on deck aft close to the poop. The problem was water splash interference in heavy weather, especially for the forward gun, although they had a great arc of fire. They were unshielded for weight reasons, but wrapped in tarpaulins to limit corrosion when not in use. They could fire a large variety of rounds, Armor Piercing (AP) 10 kg (22 lb), High Explosive (HE) 9 kg (20 lb), High Explosive Incendiary (HEI) 9.5 kg (21 lb) and Illumination (ILLUM) 9.4 kg (21 lb).

8,8cm SK L/45 Specs

Mass 2,500 kg (5,510 lb), 4 meters (13.2 ft) long.
Shell: unitary 10 kg (22.05 lb) 88 mm (3.5 in) HE
Breech: Vertical sliding-wedge
Rate of fire: 15 RPM at mv 650 m/s (2,130 ft/s)).
MPL C/13 range: −10°/+25°: 10,694 m (11,695 yd).

10.5 cm (4.1 in) SK L/45

Late boats or all were upgraded to three or two 10.5 cm (4.1 in) SK L/45, far more capable against British destroyers. They carried 70 shells per gun. These were low profile, long barrel guns also used widely by submarines. They were also present on many cruisers, of the Graudenz, Karlsruhe, Kolberg, Magdeburg, Pillau class, and the B97 class destroyers from the start.

10.5cm SK L/45 Specs

Mass: 1,450 kg (3,200 lb); Length 4.725 m (15 ft 6.0 in), Width 2.1 m (6.9 ft).
Shell: Fixed Brass Casing 25.5 kg (56 lb), 17.4 kg (38 lb)
Breech: Horizontal sliding-block for 15 RPM at 710 m/s (2,300 ft/s)
Elevation MPL C/06: -10° to +30°, effective range 12,700 m (41,700 ft)

50cm G7 Torpedoes

All these boats had now six, instead of four 19.7 inches or 5 cm torpedo tubes: Two single tubes forward behind the forecastle, the remaining two twin banks in the axis, one behind the aft funnel and last behind the mast.
By that stage, they all carried the G7, which succeeded to the G6 and G6D used by battleships and cruisers. The latter were designed in 1908 and active in 1911, capable of 35 knots for at best 8400 m at 27 knots. But work was performed on a better model, that was eventually adopted later. The G7 was easier and faster to set up, had better performances, and so were adopted in 1913. The G7 remained standard until 1934.

G7

Weight 3,009 lbs. (1,365 kg), overall length 276 in (7,020 m).
Warhead 430 lbs (195 kg) Hexanite
Range and Speed 4,370 yards (4,000 m)/37 kts or 10,170 yards (9,300 m)/27 ks
Powerplant: Decahydronaphthalene (Decalin) Wet-Heater

Mines

They could have been either the mass-produced, small, “Elektrische Minen A” differing from the former pendulum-fired mines. WH 330 lbs. (150 kg) wet gun cotton charge. Or what the British called the “Type I” Moored Hertz horn contact mine (mass 560 lbs. (254 kg) for 31.5 inches (80 cm) Wet gun guncotton 180 lbs. (81.6 kg) WH) or the “Type II” (710 lbs. (322 kg), 31.5 inches (80 cm), Wet gun guncotton; 290 lbs. (131 kg)). Sixteen of them meant they were placed on two short rails of nine each at the poop deck.

⚙ specifications V-25 group
Displacement	812 t standard, 975 tonnes (960 long tons)
Dimensions	77,8 m oa/78,5 m pp x 8,33 m x 3,63 m
Propulsion	3 boilers, 2 steam turbines: 23 500 hp
Speed	33,5 knots
Range	220t oil, 1080 nm at 20 kts
Armament	3x 88mm SK L/45, 2×2, 2×1 500mm TTs (8), 24 mines
Crew	83

german-navy.de: Compared to their predecessors, the Großes Torpedoboot (Design 1911) on which the general design of these boats was based, the Grosses Torpedoboot 1913 was slightly enlarged, their main improvement was the addition of a third 8,8 cm (later 10,5 cm) gun and the doubled number of torpedo tubes. Some boats were modified during the war to transport 1-2 float planes.

General Considerations

Expanding rapidly at the turn of the century, Germany’s torpedo forces were immediately integrated into the High Seas Fleet’s combat training regimen, evolving year by year into an increasingly formidable weapon. Operational experience, in turn, influenced the direction of naval shipbuilding. Yet, an unexpected shift occurred here. Admirals typically demanded ever-larger vessels, believing they could operate in any weather on the high seas and hold the advantage in individual skirmishes with enemy ships. German naval commanders, however, maintained that manoeuvrability and a low profile should remain the primary attributes of their destroyers. Having grown to a displacement of over 600 tons—with a persistent tendency to add tens of tons and several meters of length in each successive series—these *Hochseetorpedoboote* (high-seas torpedo boats) could no longer easily cut through tight formations of battleships without risking a collision. Consequently, the “naval lobby,” led by Admiral Lanz, insisted that, starting in 1911, only smaller destroyers be included in shipbuilding programs.

This shift in shipbuilding strategy was so significant that it was even reflected in vessel designations. The first generation of torpedo boats had stopped at number 187; instead of being designated 188, the new series destroyer built by the Vulcan firm was assigned the designation V-1.

This concept could hardly be considered a success. The V-1 and its five sister ships were merely a hundred tons lighter and 3.5 meters shorter than their predecessors, yet their lower hulls were completely awash in rough seas. Seaworthiness was also compromised by a design feature inherited from predecessors: a “dip” or well between the forecastle and the bridge, featuring forward-facing torpedo tubes. Serving aboard the “Lanz Cripples” (as the new class of torpedo boats was nicknamed) was sheer misery; bunks and food alike became thoroughly soaked with salt water, evoking memories of the tiny “tin cans” from the era of spar torpedoes. Nevertheless, the initial six were followed by a whole string of these “invalids”—twenty-four vessels in total—yet none of the renowned shipbuilders, including Schichau, managed to achieve acceptable seaworthiness in their designs. All in all, this updated standard destroyer variant effectively set progress back by about five years and offered no significant advantages—and this at a time when minor revolutions in shipbuilding were occurring almost annually!

Against this backdrop, the return to a more natural line of development two years later stood out all the more sharply. Once again, it fell to the Vulcan shipyard to execute this shift. The six V-25 class vessels were vastly superior to their predecessors. Instead of two short-barreled (30-caliber) 88mm guns, they were equipped with three guns of the same caliber but with 45-caliber barrels, allowing for a marked increase in both muzzle velocity and shell weight. Four 450mm torpedo tubes gave way to six new 500mm tubes; additionally, the standard armament included twenty-four mines. The switch to an all-oil firing system was truly revolutionary: the Germans could finally appreciate the benefits of a smaller engine-room crew, easier boiler maintenance, rapid refueling, and—crucially—an extended operational range and a top speed of 34 knots. This design established a new standard—and a truly successful one at that. However, prior to the outbreak of the war, only 12 torpedo boats had been launched: those built by the Vulcan (V-25–V-30) and Schichau (S-31–S-36) shipyards. Two additional batches of six—G-37–G-42 from the Germania yard and V-43–V-48 from Vulcan—fell under the 1914 “mobilization” program.
Experience gained during the opening months of the war necessitated adjustments. For instance, the last two vessels of the “Germania” batch were lengthened by 2.5 meters, and their oil capacity was increased by 27 tons, allowing the destroyers to cover nearly 300 extra miles at cruising speed. Vulcan went even further, extending the hulls of the V-47 and V-48 by 3.5 meters.

The next step involved upgrading the artillery armament to surpass that of their British counterparts. Although the 88mm gun fired a shell that was heavy for its caliber (nearly 10 kg), the British could counter with more numerous 4-inch guns firing 11.4 kg shells. Consequently, the Germans began mounting three 105mm guns (with a barrel length of 45 calibers) on these relatively small, 900-ton vessels. The impact of the 17 kg “calling cards” delivered by these superb guns could prove devastating to any destroyer of that era. Starting in 1916, all surviving ships from earlier series with a displacement exceeding 800 tons were fitted with this armament.

Meanwhile, destroyer displacement continued to rise from one series to the next—now without significant constraints: the 925-ton V-67 class was succeeded by the 960-ton V-85 class, while the pinnacle of the original German line of destroyer development was the V-96, which reached a displacement of 1,000 tons at normal load. This unique vessel, part of the 1916 program, featured an extended forecastle and good seaworthiness, and was capable of carrying 40 mines instead of 24.

However, by this time, the strategy for constructing German destroyers was once again …changed. Oddly enough, the reason for this was the Russian shipbuilding program—adopted prior to the war—which called for the construction of a large series of big destroyers based on the design of the highly successful *Novik*. Some of the most complex components for the ships already under construction—specifically, 40,000-horsepower turbines—had been ordered from the German firm Blohm & Voss. The outbreak of war led to the immediate confiscation of these nearly completed mechanisms. The question arose: what was to be done with this unexpected “gift”? The turbines were unsuitable for the navy’s own torpedo boats due to their excessive power and size. The firm then proposed an unexpected solution: building new hulls “around the machinery” modeled on the Russian design—a feasible plan, given the wealth of blueprints and other technical materials remaining from their recent collaboration. Torpedo warfare specialists vehemently objected; the design would result in a displacement of 1,350 tons and an increase in length of 15 meters, and—more broadly—such “Russian-German” ships did not fit the prevailing tactical doctrines of the Kaiser’s navy. Then came a stern intervention from Tirpitz. The old admiral—creator of the *Hochseeflotte* and a living legend—grasped the situation far better than his younger colleagues. In a “major war,” destroyers would have to engage in gun battles with heavily armed adversaries, and for this purpose, the “Russian variant” was far superior.

Consequently, Blohm & Voss received an order not only for four ships (matching the number of completed turbines) but for another 12 vessels of the same class. Thus, Germany acquired its first true destroyers—classified as *Zerstörer* (the German equivalent of the English “destroyer”)—whereas previously, even 1,000-ton vessels had officially been designated *Hochseetorpedoboote* (high-seas torpedo boats). These ships possessed significant merits: high speed, good seaworthiness, and more powerful armament. Regarding the latter, however, the Germans had somewhat miscalculated. They had been unable to replace the four 102mm guns (based on the Russian design) with an equal number of their own powerful 105mm guns, as the latter had not yet been fully perfected by the time the project was approved. Consequently, they had to settle for 88mm guns. The consequences were immediate: shortly after entering service in August 1915, the brand-new *V-99* and *V-100* engaged in a long-range battle with their “progenitor,” the *Novik*. The outcome of the clash is well known: the Germans suffered a crushing defeat without inflicting any losses on the enemy, as most of their shells simply fell short of the target. Therefore, once the 105mm guns became available, the German “Noviks” were among the first candidates for an armament upgrade. From 1916 onwards, they became formidable adversaries for any enemy destroyer.

Incidentally, the Germans managed to acquire ships not only from the enemy but also from entirely innocent neutral nations. Back in 1912, Argentina—which, incidentally, was one of the few South American countries intending to side with Germany during the war—had ordered four large turbine-powered destroyers (*Santiago*, *San Luis*, *Santa Fe*, and *Tucumán*), each armed with four 102mm guns. An interesting feature of the design was the inclusion of diesel engines for cruising. The “Argentine” ships were already nearing completion when World War I broke out. The requisitioned vessels were hastily rearmed—modeled after the former Russian *Novik* class—and commissioned into the Kaiser’s navy under the designations G-101 through G-104. Ultimately, none of them ever reached their original customer; interned at Scapa Flow following the armistice, they were scuttled by their crews, later raised, and—after undergoing trials—scrapped.

Another neutral nation—the Netherlands—also made a contribution, albeit a more modest one, to bolstering the strength of the Imperial German Navy by ordering four destroyers (Z1–Z4) just before hostilities began. Small (displacing only 340 tons) and relatively slow (28 knots), they were nonetheless requisitioned in August 1914 and armed haphazardly with whatever guns were available at the time of commissioning: V-105 and V-107 received two short-barreled 88mm guns each, V-106 was fitted with only a pair of 52mm guns, and V-108 received two long-barreled 88mm guns. In any case, the artillery and torpedo armament of these former “Dutch” ships fell far short of German standards, necessitating their use in auxiliary roles. That said, this did not prevent them from seeing combat. The destroyer V-107 struck a mine and sank in May 1915, while V-106 reached the end of its service life by the war’s conclusion and was scrapped. The two remaining small destroyers of the series went on to serve under the Polish flag after the war; named *Kaszub* and *Mazur*, they remained in service until the late 1930s.

The requisitioned ships, of course, did not play a decisive role in the Kaiser’s torpedo forces. By the end of the war, the backbone of the fleet consisted of the “descendants” of the V-96, produced in large numbers. This type became known as the “1916 mobilization class.” Had it not been for Germany’s defeat, this class would undoubtedly have become the most numerous in the German Navy: by November 1918, nearly 50 vessels had been launched, although only 18 had actually entered service. They differed from one another primarily in displacement: while the initial “mobilization” series (V-125) displaced a mere 925 tons, the final vessels (the unfinished H-166 through H-169) displaced 1,060 tons. However, this change had no impact on their combat power and yielded only a marginal improvement in seaworthiness, while speed dropped by 1.5 knots and operational range decreased slightly. The reason for this situation was that, by the war’s end, Germany had virtually exhausted all its resources—both material and human. There was a shortage of high-strength steel, and the majority of skilled shipyard workers had been sent to the front. Construction standards slipped; weight overruns—previously uncharacteristic of German shipyards—became so commonplace that they began to be factored into the designs themselves.

Nevertheless, when evaluating the German destroyers of World War I as a whole, one must acknowledge that they were highly successful designs. Ideally sized for operations in the North and Baltic Seas, these destroyers boasted respectable gun and torpedo armaments. Furthermore, they were distinguished by the high reliability and trouble-free performance of their machinery. It is telling that several captured ships transferred to the French Navy remained in service until the mid-1930s—significantly longer than their French-built contemporaries (mkonline.ru).

1913 Program V25-30 Sub-Group

German TBs postwar under US custody. First ship on left is V43 of the Großes Torpedoboot 1913 class. Second from left G-102, third from left S-132. S-132 was scuttled at Scapa Flow in shallow water, was then quickly refloated and given to the US. Commissioned in June 1920 for voyage to US, was decommissioned in Norfolk in August, then sunk as target on 15 July 1921. The first ship on the left is almost certainly V-43, the third of German torpedo boats taken to US after World War I. Fourth ship from left is named Redwing as identified from related photo shot between June 1920 and July 1921.

With the destroyers of the fiscal year 1913, the German Navy returned – alter the unsatisfactory performances of the type 1911-12 boats – to increased dimensions. Considering the general political situation and the performances of foreign destroyers the switch to greater displacement and pure oil-burning produced very desirable results: higher speed, better steaming capabilities and better seaworthiness, increased action radius and increased gun power. Compared with the last big coal-burning destroyers it should be noted that oil-burning meant a remarkable reduction in machinery personnel. These boats were to be armed with a new generation of weapons: the improved 8.8cm KL/45 torpedo-boat gun and the new, more powerful 50cm torpedo. Specs above.

Modernizations:

In 1916 V25 was temporary used for experiments by carrying a single FF 33B seaplane launched from platform installed forward. She struck a mine on 13/2/1915 in the North Sea. V 27 and V 29 were lost in action at Jutland, the former by British cruisers, latter by HMS Petard. V30 was lost on 20/11/1918 on a mine while underway to be interned at Scapa Flow.

V25 (1913)

SM V25 was ordered in 1913 from AG Vulcan, Stettin, launched on 29 January 1914 and commissioned on 27 June 1914. She was first deployed in the Baltic coast-defence division. On 7 September she sortied with her group in the Gulf of Bothnia led by cruiser Augsburg, spotting and sinkinh a Russian steamer off Raumo. By October 1914 she entered the 17th Half-flotilla, High Seas Fleet, based in the west. On 14 January 1915, Strassburg and Stralsund escorted by the 9th TBF including her were sent to lay a minefield off the Humber in poor weather, so much so V25 collided with V26 (minor damage). They were ordered to turned back. On 12 February, the 9th TBF screened minesweeping operations near the Amrum Bank, North Sea. V25 was never heard of again and a search party found wreckage north of Helgoland. her loss was later attributed to a British mine, she sank will all (79) hans and Korvettenkapitän Paul Jacobi. A new destroyer of the Kriegsmarine was named after him.

V26 (1913)

V26 was ordered in 1913 at AG Vulcan under hull n°347, launched on 21 February 1914 and commissioned on 27 August 1914. On 1 August 1914, she was deployed to the Baltic, part of the coast-defence division and on 9 August with her sister V25 and V186 they escorted Augsburg and Magdeburg on a sortie, but soon turned back and returned to Memel on 11 August due to fuel shortages. But they took part in the 15-20 August, with the minelayer Deutschland at the entrance to the Gulf of Finland. They soon spotted the cruisers Admiral Makarov and Gromoboi, but they failed to attack as believing they were two armoured cruisers. On 26 August she escorted Magdeburg again in the Gulf of Finland when the cruiser ran aground off Osmussaar. V26 could not pull her free. She saved her crew before the arrival of Bogatyr and Pallada. V26 was hit by a 6 in shell at her stern, destroying the officers’ quarters and she lost a turbine’s steam pipe. The Russians retrieved the code, books passed to the British and used by Room 40. By September V26 and V186 had been sent to the North Sea, relieved by G132–G136. By October she entered the 17th HTBF, 9th TBF, and after the attack on 18 October by E1 on Victoria Louise her unit was sent off the Fehmarn Belt but on the 19th relieved by the 8th TBF and back to Kiel.
On 15 December 1914 Franz von Hipper started the raid on Scarborough, Hartlepool and Whitby, escorted by the 9th TBF. The arrived off the Humber in very poor weather. V26 collided with V25 and they were ordered back.
On 10 February 1916, V26 was part of the 2nd, 6th and 9th TBF sortie into the North Sea, meeting British minesweepers off the Dogger Bank. Arabis was torpedoed and sunk by the 2nd Flotilla. On 24 April battlecruisers of I Scouting Group and II Scouting Group cruisers sortied to Yarmouth and Lowestoft, with 6th and 9th TBFs. She then took part in the Battle of Jutland, making a attempted torpedo attack on battlecruisers at 17:26 PM, but V26 managed to launch a single torpedo which missed. British destroyers of the 13th and the 10th DF arrived and forced them back. V26 collected the crew of V27, dead in the water after being hit, trying to scuttle her but failed. V27 also failed, so both sunk her by gunfire. V26 als rescued men from V29. At 19:15 GMT she took part in another large-scale torpedo attack to cover the general turn to the west. She launched three torpedoes, but missed. Next she was part in the inconclusive Action of 19 August with the 1st Scouting Group.
In October the 3rd and 9th TBF made a sortie to Flanders, against the Dover Barrage. V26 was then part of the 18th HTBF, 9th TBF from Wilhelmshaven on 23 October, and rauding the objective on the night of 26/27 October. V26 operate off Calais, passing through the Dover Straits coastal guns, twice encountering British warships, spotting also four British destroyers off Dunkirk. When challenged they used Flirt’s RN signal and continued. They were mistook for the Laforey division. But on site they saw no merchant vessels and while back, clashed with three destroyers, and lost contact. Others had more luck with drifters of the Barrage. They damaged the DD HMS Flirt, merchant ship The Queen, destroyer Nubian. Next they rampaged the coast of the Netherlands on 1 November. On 23/24 November, V26 was sent to attack shipping in the Downs, clashing with drifters, but found no shipping. On 26/27 November, same, they stopped the Dutch merchant ship Beijerland, sank the trawler Narval but V30 and S34 collided. They were back on 30 November.

V26 collided with UB-25 at Kiel, 19 March 1917. This was severe as UB-25 sank. Herself lost 16. UB-25 was later salvaged and repaired, used as training submarine. Late April 1917 saw her fitted for minesweeping and her unit along the 6th Flotilla led by SMS Emden, Graudenz, Frankfurt and Bremse made a commerce-raiding sortie into the Skaggerak/Kattegat on 10–13 March 1918. V26 was still in her unit by November 1918, but she was not interned at Scapa Flow and remained in German hands, Eisernen Flottille (volunteer force used for security duties, with the torpedo tubes removed). On 21 June 1919 V26 aftet the scuttling wwas attributed in compensation under the Treaty of Versailles, sent to Cherbourg, not wanted, sold for scrap on 21 October 1920, at Portishead in 1922.

V27 (1913)

SM V27 was ordered in 1913 from AG Vulcan, Stettin, launched on 26 March 1914 and commissioned on 2 September 1914. By October 1914, V27 was in the 17th HF, 9th TBF under training until deployed to the Baltic for operations against British submarines. On 15-17 December transferred to the West, she took part in the Raid on Scarborough, Hartlepool and Whitby and Battle of the Gulf of Riga by August 1915.
Next she was at the Battle of Jutland in support of the battlecruisers. She took part in a torpedo attack on British battlecruisers at 16:26 GMT, disrupted by British destroyer. V27 took two 4-inch (102 mm) hits, one blowing her main steam pipe so she lost all power, stranded until her crew was taken off by V26, then scuttled by gunfire.

V28 (1913)

SM V28 was ordered in 1913 from AG Vulcan, launched on 9 May 1914 and commissioned on 22 September. She ws also in the 9th Torpedo Boat Flotilla as lead boat from October and from 15 December her forced joined the battlecruiser squadron under Franz von Hipper, for the raid on Scarborough, Hartlepool, West Hartlepool and Whitby. On 14 January 1915 she followed the cruisers Strassburg and Stralsund leading the 9th TBF before her through a minefield off the Humberin poor weather. Heavy seas saw V25 and V26 colliding so V28 requested from Hipper such conditions and obtained the right, to turn back that she gave to her unit leaving the cruisers alone. On 21–22 April V28 sortied off the Dogger Bank aznd claimed the trawler “Cancer” from Grimsby. In August she was back in the Baltic Sea for the Battle of the Gulf of Riga. On 10 August, V28 escorted Kolberg shelling Utö island and she met five Russian destroyers. On 20 August she took part in the attack on Pernau with blockships and with S32, V183 and V108, engaging the coastal batteries of the citadel. However this ended a failure with S31 and V99, T46 sunk.
On 10 February 1916, V28 was part of a sortie by 2nd, 6th and 9th TBF into the North Sea, ending with the battle of the Dogger Bank. On 24 April she escorted the I Scouting Group and II Scouting Group from Kiel for the raid on Yarmouth and Lowestoft, under escort by 6th and 9th TBF. They briefly clashed with the Harwich Force.

Next, V28 was at the Battle of Jutland, still at the head of the 9th TBF with battlecruisers. They took part in the torpedo run at 16:26 GMT but missed and withdrew after the loss of V27. Another later run was marred by poor visibility and from 19:15 GMT a new one to cover the German battleships as they turned away. They came under heavy fire: V28 was hit by a single 6-inch (152 mm) shell forward, gashing her hull at the waterline, causing flooding, so she went down to 17–19 knots, launched her last torpedo but missed. She took part in the Action of 19 August with the 1st Scouting Group. In October her flotilla was sent to Flanders, to attack the Dover Barrage. V28 was in the 18th HF, still 9th TBF when leaving Wilhelmshaven on 23 October for Belgium and a rirst night raid on 26/27 October against Allied shipping off Calais. They passed defences of the Dover Straits, and four British destroyers but later clashed with three destroyers; which later lost contact. V28 took part in the raid on the Downs, clashing with patrolling drifters. Same on 26/27 November, capturing the Beijerland and sinking the trawler Narval. In April 1917 all the DDs were refitted for minesweeping. On 3 October 1918 V28 was off Terschelling with V79, S33 and S34 when S34 struck a mine and sank and started a rescue, observed by HMS L10, which torpedoed and sank S33 but lost balance and surfaced, to be fire at by V28 and V79. By the Armistice of 11 November, V28 remained in German hands, Eisernen Flottille, without torpedo tubes. On 21 June 1919 after the mass scuttling of Scapa she was one transferred (10 destroyers), sent to Cherbourg, but she remained unwanted and was scrapped by Britain after being sold on 21 October 1920 BU at Portishead in 1922.

V29 (1913)

V29 was ordered in 1913 at AG Vulcan, launched on 18 August 1914 and commissioned on 19 October 1914. On 15 December she was inin escort of Von Hipper’s Battlecruisers of the 1st Scouting Group for the raid of Scarborough, Hartlepool, West Hartlepool and Whitby but with the heavy weather, ordered to turn back. On 23 January 1915 she was part of the raid on British fishing boats on the Dogger Bank. V29 was in the 18th HFTB in escort. Room 40, despatched Beatty’s “splendid cats” from Rosyth, flag HMS Lion, with the Harwich Force in support, leading to the clash of 24 January (Battle of Dogger Bank). On 12 February she was deployed to screen minesweeping ops. near the Amrum Bank, North Sea. She later searched for V25 that did not return. By August she was in the Baltic Sea, for the Battle of the Gulf of Riga (see above).
Next at the Battle of Jutland she escorted Hipper’s battlecruisers as part of the 9th Flotilla, making several torpedo attacks but all missing (see above). However at the second at 16:26 GMT her formation was met by British destroyers, and V29 was hit in the stern by a torpedo from HMS Petard. Her bow remained afloat for 30 minutes so that she could launch four torpedoes and taken in tow by V26 and S35. Later in the day, S35 was sunk by shellfire from HMS Iron Duke and had on board survivors from V29…

V30 (1913)

SMS V30 was ordered from AG Vulcan, Stettin, Launched on 18 September 1914, commissioned on 16 November 1914. On 23 January 1915, she was part of the sorties against British fishing boats on the Dogger Bank leading to a full battle on 24 January. In August 1915 she was sent in the Baltic Sea for the Battle of the Gulf of Riga on 8–9 August and 16-19 August escorting Bremen. On 10 February 1916, she was part of a massed sortie into the North Sea off the Dogger Bank. On 24 April 1916, she escorted the I Scouting Group and II Scouting Group to Yarmouth and Lowestoft. V30 was present also at the Battle of Jutland in the 18th HF, 9th TBF with the battlecruisers. She made three torpedo attacks without results. She was also in the inconclusive Action of 19 August also with the 1st Scouting Group.

In October the 3rd and 9th TBF were sent to Flanders, leaving Wilhelmshaven on 23 October. She took part in the night raid through the English Channel on 26/27 October, sent off Calais. While back after seeing no targets worth attacking but crossing destroyers, she clashed with three British destroyers attempting to pursue them. A lucky hit on HMS Mohawk’s rudder, jamming, led to the other to dodge her and loose contact. Later they crossed and attacked drifters on the Dover Barrage. DDs Flirt, “The Queen” were sunk, HMS Nubian badly damaged (cut in half, future “Zubian”). V30 also attacked the coast of the Netherlands on 1 November and on 23/24 November, she joined a force of 13 torpedo boats raiding the Downs, clashing with patrolling drifters. On 26/27 November she helped capturing the Dutch merchant ship Beijerland and sinking the trawler Narval. V30 and S34 collided however and she was back home for repairs on 30 November. By late April 1917, fitted for minesweeping she took part in a few sorties. By 11 November 1918 she was allocated for internment at Scapa Flow, but struck a mine, sunk underway on 20 November, killing 2.

Next Updates: 1913 Program Schichau S31-36 Sub-Group.