RN Fleet Carriers: CVA-01, CVA-02
Well before the actual Queen Elizabeth class, the CVA-01 remains the greatest “what-if” of British Cold War History, as far as ships are concerned. She was the most ambitious aircraft carrier project in Europe, a 63,000 tonnes, 890 ft or 270m CATOBAR (Fully Loaded) that would have been the first to operate nuclear-strike jets. It was larger than the largest British CVs in service, Eagle (54,000t) and Ark Royal (43,000t), and designed from the ground up with a broad flight deck for simultaneous landing and launching operations, capable of operating at 30 knots based on 135,000 hp some 50+ aircraft. A class of guided missile destroyer was even designed to escort her “East of Suez”, the large Bristol class (Type 82). But the 1966 white paper cancelled them both, albeit HMS Bristol was eventually completed to test new ideas. Prospective names would have been HMS Queen Elizabeth for CVA-01 and HMS Duke of Edinburgh for CVA-02.
Development
The short Story (Conway’s Take on CVA-01)
The story of the last class of fleet carriers designed for the RN is a harrowing one – although it must be said that the cancellation of the programme in 1966 necessary, if only to save the Navy from getting the wrong carrier – and it will remain a classic example of how a design can be ruined by constraints. The MoD needed two new fleet carriers to replace Victorious and Eagle in the early 1970s and their role was seen as providing strike power against airfields and hostile ships, and air defence for the fleet. It was hoped that the project would be backed by the RAF as well, using the planned joint RAF/FAA swing-wing ‘strike fighter’ as the principal unit of the air group. When that aircraft died stillborn the new carrier design (designated CVA-01 or Attack Carrier, as was absolutely in the USN) hit its first problem. The second was purely political, for both Lord Mountbatten and his VCNS were certain that the Treasury and the ‘bomber lobby’ in the RAF would oppose a large carrier.

HMS Ark Royal, which was smaller than Eagle, one of the capable fleet carriers in 1962.
This proved to be the case, and when it was pointed out that a carrier capable of accommodating the latest aircraft and catapults of the necessary length would displace over 60,000t, the politicians asked for the length of catapult to be reduced (!). To cope with such ill-considered requests the designers cut the catapults from four to two and eliminated the deck park, reducing displacement to 55,000t, but there was still pressure to cut the size to 30,000t, half as big as the original target. Even though the design was changed to a “furniture van” concept, with very light structure, no armour and only a novel form of underwater protection against torpedoes, it could not be reduced below 50,000t. Speed was restricted to 27–28kts, but after doubts were raised about putting so much power out through two shafts, the old 3-shaft system of the Illustrious class was re-adopted, so that one engine could be closed down for maintenance and still leave enough power for Fleet speed.
The flight deck layout was unusual, offset to port, but angled at only 32°, The passageway (known as the ‘Alaska highway’) fitted in Hermes and other carriers was made even wider, allowing aircraft as well as vehicles to be moved forward and aft reasons. Things got worse. To fit all the requirements in such a small hull, many ingenious ideas were adopted. This was a recipe for disaster, as experience shows that only some 20-25 per cent novelty can be accepted in a design; more than this raises insoluble problems. With hindsight the biggest blunder was the political one of confusing size with cost, but given without disturbing the deck park. There were other novel features, such as doors at the after end of the hangar to allow the engines to be run inside, and a new ‘scissors’ type of lift.
The Long Story
In the 1960s, the Royal Navy was still a premium carrier user, second only to the US Navy with the large Ark Royal and Eagle, and lighter Victorious, and Hermes, all reconstructed with angled deck and all the niceties to operate jets, and put to the latest standards in terms of radars and C3. Their achilles heel however was an air group limited to just 25 aircraft, usally 20 fighters-bombers and five helicopters. HMS Centaur was modernised top operate advanced Supermarine Scimitars and Sea Vixens in 1959, but she was too small to carry nuclear strike aircraft (Buccaneer) and was only an interim as Eagle was rebuilt for the purpose. The S.2 version of the Blackburn Buccaneer could only be accomodated on Ark Royal and Eagle, 14 each, plus redesigned McDonnell Douglas F-4 Phantoms, which was intended for procurement. The target for an ideal strike carrier was 40 aircraft, still less than half a Kitty Hawk-class.
However with the larger size and weight of modern jets, a larger deck area was required and at some point in 1962, existing carriers, based on WW2 designs, had been stretched and widened as much as possible. Most also were nearing their service limit for the same reason with only Hermes in the best shape. The Victorious and Hermes, expensively modernised were just too small. So there was no way around it: The Royal Navy to stay relevant in the 1970s needed modern, large aircraft carriers. Approval to the idea was secured in the January 1962 strategic paper COS(621)1 of the British Strategy in the Sixties, and the Admiralty Board went through six possible designs ranging from 42,000 to 68,000 tons at full load. The largest was in short a scaled down Forrestal, with a deck large enough for four full-sized steam catapults. It was rejected ouright as too costly.
On the lower end, a 42,000-ton carrier was just capable of opertating 27 jets, a 55,000-ton carrier 49 jets, 80% increase in air group for 30% more displacement. So by 1961 a baseline of 48,000 tons was setup for discussions, and roles were defined, starting with a primary role as strike carrier, then defence of the fleet. For the first time, their catapults agreed early on would be able to operate early warning aircraft, possibly a radom-equipped Gannet, and could be converted to only operate ASW helicopters, or used them as complement to SAR helicopters, four of each ideally. But the cost remained a serious issue. Indeed, the Treasury and Air Ministry estimated a limited fleet of long-range strike aircraft ioperating from bases around the globe (The “East of Suez” policy was present). This appeared a much more cost-effective solution. The Royal Navy would would have to fight an uphill battle to scure its budget.
CVA-01 was added a 3rd role of commando carrier, with a capacity of 1,125 Royal Marines plus vehicles, 14 Wessex HU.5, 4 BAC–McDonnell-Douglas F-4K Phantom FG.1 and even provisions to operate the Grumman F-111B Aardvark of the USN in cooperation.
By April 1963 it was planned an ambitious four ships in this prospective class, but they had to compete with four Polaris missile SSBNs FY1963 and these new carriers being larger, they had to include investments for berths at shipyards, and the shipyard skills to weld QT35 steel, skilled electrical fitters and extra office capacity as well as a new dry dock at Portsmouth to manage the 900 feet hull.
By July 1963, the new fell from the treasury, a single carrier would be built with an option in case the Australian Navy was interested by the design. At the time, the RAN operated the light carriers HMAS Melbourne and Sydney, both soon involved in Vietnam Operations.
Design of the class
The CVA-01 sketch, a name that reflected on USN practice, was approved by the Admiralty in July 1963. The final draft stayed at 890 ft (270 m) at the waterline with three shafts and a new steam plant design for 27–28 knots enabling one shaft to be shut down for maintenance at all times and a new, more powerful electrical distribution system with 3.3 kV transformers for current and future electronics.

Plans of the island and strcutures (the only ones released so far) Greenwhich coll.
Hull and general design
The CVA-01 was to displace “no more than 54,500 tons”, assumed to be standard with a flight deck length, with the bridle arrester boom set at 963 ft 3 in (293.60 m) as well as 189 ft (58 m) wide for an overall width of 231 ft 4 in (70.51 m), which was a record for any Euro carrier to that point. The hull was 925 ft (281.9 m) overall for a beam of 184 ft (56.1 m) and draught of 33 ft (10.1 m).
Powerplant
The CVA 01 was fitted from the start with 3 shafts, fixed pitch propellers, likely 3-bladed, each driven by its own Parsons 2-stage geared steam turbine. They were fed by the high pressure steam coming from 6 Admiralty Yarrow boilers for a grand total of 135,000 shp (101,000 kW). Top speed was estimated 30 knots (56 km/h; 35 mph) on trials, 25-28 practical. Range was estimated c7,000 nmi (13,000 km; 8,100 mi).
Protection
Her underwater protection of bulkheads and void spaced was designed to resist a 1,800 lb warhead charge. Initially, no armour was planned but was added to the magazines, ship sides, and hangar bringing displacement up to 54,500 tons.
But the figures integrated in the December 1965 still integrated the following:
Belt: 1.5 in; flight deck: 1.25 in; Sea Dart magazine: 2 in; other magazines: 1.5-2.5 in; hangar and machinery spaces: 1 in.
Armament
Defences included the following: Ikara anti-submarine system, two Sea Dart anti-aircraft missile (under development).
Ikara ASW
Developed in Australia as an equivalent to the US ASROC system, this torpedo-carrying missile had a range superior to all ASW RLs at the time. It would have been fitted likely aft on the large stern deck or its sponson. However the Ikara system was deleted from the design in February 1965.
Sea Dart
The twin-arm launchers were located either side of the quarterdeck sponsons. However for cost-cutting, one Sea Dart was removed and remaining one was relocated on the now freed quartedeck axis with a larger magazine of 38 missiles. Seacat was considered as one option but most authors thinks it would have been likely cancelled in the finalised design.
Sea Dart specifications
Weight: 550 kg (1,210 lb)
Dimensions: 4.4 x 0.42, wp 0.9m (14 ft x 17 in x 3.0 ft)
Warhead: 11 kg (24 lb) HE blast-fragmentation, Proximity fuze and contact
Engine: Chow solid-fuel booster motor + Bristol Siddeley Odin ramjet cruise motor
Range, mod 0: 40 nmi (46 mi; 74 km)
Flight ceiling: 18,300 m (60,000 ft)
Maximum speed: Mach 3.0+
Guidance: Semi-active radar illuminated by radar Type 909 (J-band)
Sensors
The suite comprised the following:
Air search/surveillance Type 988 (later cancelled) with CDS.
Alternative primary ASR Type 984 with CDS or Type 965
Search Radar Type 992 (posible)
Fighter control radar Type 982
Height-finding/air direction radar Type 983
Sea Dart fire control radar: Two Type 909
Navigation radar Type 974.
The large ‘Broomstick’ radar dome was a dominating feature, set above the central island and planned to house the (later cancelled) Type 988 Anglo-Dutch 3D radar, to be also fitted on the Dutch Tromp-class frigates, but that was never realized.
Air Facilities

The flight deck had new and powerful steam catapults as well as the most powerful arrester gear planned, ideal to stop the largest conceivable jets to operate frop her deck, like the Grumman F-111 projected nuclear strike jet. The catapults, one on the forward flight deck, another on the angled portion, had 250 ft (76 m) long catapults, capable of projecting 70,000 lb (35t) and set at 4 degrees apart. The forwardmost was offset to starboard. In theory that left space for a “free launch” (unassisted) on the same portion of flight deck, but port side. There would have been also four take-off positions to operate V/STOL aircraft painted on deck and defined with thermal-resistant paint. There was a single 650 x 80 ft hangar topped by a semi-protected FD, as seen above it was 884 x 191 ft (270 x 52m) and slightly angled. There were 35,000 lb arrestor wires and two BS-6 250ft (76m) 70,000 lb (35t) steam catapults with bridle catchers, one located as seen above at the starboard bow and one at the waist. There were also two 40,000 lb (20 tons) 72 x 30 ft (22 x 9m) lifts, one on the centre line and another on the deck edge.
Air Group
Initially the air group comprised in a pure strike group configuration some 30 Buccaneer and Sea Vixen. The future F.111 variable geometry model under Operational Requirement OR.346 was to be operational from 1975 onards. In the Intervention Study (IWP/65) against Indonesia of 1965, Royal Navy assumed CVA-01 and HMS Hermes could be posted 400 nautical miles off southern Java, to operate 31 Buccaneers (24 for CVA-01 and 7 for Hermes) plus 24 Phantoms (12 for CVA-01 and 12 for Hermes) in order to deal with the Indonesian air force and its twenty Tu-16 Badger bombers, twenty Yak-28 Brewer bombers from six airfields.
The final aircraft complemen approved on 27 January 1966 mixed 36 British specs. Phantom II as defence fighters and Blackburn Buccaneer low-level strike aircraft plus four early-warning aircraft (to determine), five ASW helicopters, two SAR helicopters.

⚙ December 1965 specifications |
|
| Displacement | 53,000 long tons light, 54,500 tons standard, 63,000 tons (64,000 tonnes) DL |
| Dimensions | 890 x 122 x 33.5 feet (271.3 x 37.2 x 10.2 meters) |
| Propulsion | 3 shafts Parsons steam turbines, 6x Admiralty boilers: 135,000shp |
| Speed | 30 knots trials, 28 knots EOS, 25kts operating catapults |
| Range | Prospective 8,000 nm |
| Armament | 1×2 Sea Dart GWS.30 Mod 0 (40) |
| Protection | Belt 1.5 in, FD 1.25 in, Sea Dart mag. 2 in, others 1.5-2.5 in. Hangar/mach. spaces 1 in. |
| Sensors | Type 988 with CDS/Type 984/Type 965, Type 992, Type 982, Type 983, 2x Type 909, Type 974. |
| Air Facilities | 650 x 80 ft hangar, 884 x 191 ft FD, 4 arrestor wires, 2 steam catapults, 2 lifts. |
| Air Group | Up to 50 aircraft. Phantom FG.1, Buccaneer S.2, Gannet AEW.3, Sea King HAS.1, Wessex HAS.1. |
| Crew | 3,250 crew and airgroup |
These specs are still debated today. These are the ones scheduled for issue to shipbuilders in January 1966, but delayed until cancellation in February 1966.
Fate of CVA-01 class
HMS QUEEN ELIZABETH (1969)
Pennant unknown. Probably to be awarded to J. Brown, Clydebank. She was to have been laid down in September 1967, launched in September 1969, finish sea trials by December 1971 and achieve full operational status by June 1973.
HMS DUKE OF EDINBURGH (1971)
Pennant unknown. Portsmouh Royal Dockyard. Possibly been laid down at the completion of the new dock, somewhere in 1968-69, launched 1971, in sea trials by 1973, full operational status c1975.
Cancellation

In mid-1963 already, MoD Peter Thorneycroft announced in Parliament this new class would cost c£60 millio. The Treasury argued however the final cost was likely closer to £100 million based on the add R&D for the DHawker Siddeley P.1154 supersonic V/STOL (which became the Harrier). CVA-01 was supposed to fit in the triumvir made also by Eagle and Hermes until 1980. However the new elections of October 1964 brought a Labour Government dead set at cutting back defence spending. The RAF attacked the new carrier to save its own BAC TSR-2 and the co-developed newt F-111. Later both the paerliament and treasury started to argue about the size issues of the new carrier, asking it would be no more than 53,000 tons. But the Navy argued that was not realistic and wanted 55,000 tons. Then a festival of penny-pinching started, with many politicians wanting to reduce top speed, deck space, armour, radar equipment.
By February 1966, the new Sec.State.Defence Denis Healey, was definitely on board with the RAF in part due to cost issues associated with fleet carriers, and it was all decided in the 1966 Defence White Paper. In this fateful document, CVA-01 was canceled along woth the remaining Type 82 destroyers (Bristol class) that were planned in escort. The free budget would go solely into the modernization of Eagle and Ark Royal. The chief designer of CVA-01 said Navy officials later that after all these reductions the design was no longer viable anyway, and perhaps it save the Navy of an unwanted carrier well below its needs. There were no regrets as in 1967 a new review ending the global presence “East of Suez”, that nullified RN assets involvements outside British waters. No long after, the purchase of F-111s was cancelled as well, but the aircraft morphed in the US, from Grumman to General Dyamics and became the bomber we know.

The final (very compromised) design approved by December 1965 and cancelled in February 1966
During negociations, the RAF made its arguments in the Defence Review Board about an adequate cover better provided East of Suez by RAF strike aircraft from Australia and uninhabited islands in the Indian Ocean. By the 1970s the Hermes could still provide an additional long range support. The white paper assessed the RN should concentrate on its cmomitment in the North Atlantic. Eventually the RAF was also punished with the cancellation of 150 TSR2 aircraft ordered in 1965 for instead an “island hopping” strategy. This was the start of a long exlipse for the RN.
The decision for the RN to have Eagle and Ark Royal overhauled and modified to operate 52 Phantoms was later reversed when the decision was taken to phase out fixed-wing flying by 1972, Victorious retired in 1969, Hermes converted as a “Harrier carrier” and commando carrier to replace Albion in 1971–1973. Ark Royal eventually only had an austere radar refit but was granted operations of the Phantom despite her smaller size. An new change in government led to Ark Royal having a last austere refit in 1967–1970, Eagle decommissioned in 1972 and the second squadron of F-4 Phantoms transferred to the RAF. Eagle was maintained for until 1978. But the decision to go for the Harrier led to the “Through Deck Cruiser” that became the Invincible class. They proved “enough” for the serious test of the falkland Wars in 1982.
Part of the work done of the CVA-01 was not lost. All the R&D than went in it was partly recycled when launching a replacement program for the Invincible class, what became the Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carrier, which ended even larger than the cancelled CVA-01s, under the new acronym CVF and a contract announced on 25 July 2007 by MoD Des Browne. They were commissioned in 2017-19.
Read More/Src
Books
Brown, D. K. & Moore, George (2003). Rebuilding the Royal Navy: Warship Design since 1945. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press. ISBN 1-59114-705-0.
Royal United Services Institute Journal – Aug 2006, Vol. 151, No. 4 By Simon Elliott – CVA-01 and CVF – What Lessons Can the Royal Navy Learn from the Cancelled 1960s Aircraft Carrier for its New Flat-top?
Friedman, Norman (1988). British Carrier Aviation: The Evolution of the Ships and Their Aircraft. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press. ISBN 0-87021-054-8.
Gorst, Anthony (2004). “CVA-01”. In Harding, Richard (ed.). The Royal Navy 1930–2000: Innovation and Defence. Naval Policy and History. Vol. 30. Abingdon, UK: Cass. pp. 170–92. ISBN 0-7146-8581-X.
Hobbs, David (2013). British Aircraft Carriers: Design, Development and Service Histories. Barnsley, UK: Seaforth Publishing. ISBN 978-1-84832-138-0.
Sturton, Ian (2014). “CVA-01: Portrait of a Missing Link”. In Jordan, John (ed.). Warship 2014. London: Conway. pp. 28–48. ISBN 978-1-84486-236-8.
Links
navy-matters.beedall.com archive: The go-To
tandfonline.com/
discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk
web.archive.org/ naval-review.com/
publications.parliament.uk/
secretprojects.co.uk
web.archive.org/ ijnhonline.org/
en.wikipedia.org CVA-01
steamcommunity.com/ model
bbc.com/news/
Greenwhich Col. CVA 01 plans
